We propose two simple and efficient deterministic extractors for an ordinary elliptic curve E, defined over F 2 N , where N = 2 and is a positive integer. Our extractors, for a given point P on E, output respectively the first or the second F 2 -coefficient of the abscissa of the point P . We also propose two deterministic extractors for the main subgroup G of E, where E has minimal 2-torsion. We show that if a point P is chosen uniformly at random in G, the bits extracted from the point P are indistinguishable from a uniformly random bit-string of length .
Introduction
A deterministic extractor for an elliptic curve is a function that converts a random point on the curve to a random-looking bit-string, i.e., a bit-string statistically close to uniformly random. In this paper, we propose two simple and efficient deterministic extractors for an ordinary elliptic curve E defined over F 2 N , where N = 2 and is an arbitrary positive integer. Our first extractor, H 0 , for a given point P on E, outputs the first F 2 -coefficient of the abscissa of the point P . Similarly the second extractor, H 1 , for a given point on E, outputs the second F 2 -coefficient of the abscissa of the point. Provided that the point P is chosen uniformly at random in E, the extracted bits of the point P are indistinguishable from a uniformly random bit-string of length .
The problem of converting random points of an elliptic curve into random bits has several cryptographic applications. One such application is a class of key exchange protocols based on elliptic curves (e.g, the well-known Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman protocol). By the end of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman protocol, the parties agree on a common secret element of the group, which is indistinguishable from a uniformly random element under the decisional DiffieHellman assumption (denoted by DDH). However the binary representation of the common secret element is distinguishable from a uniformly random bit-string of the same length. Hence one has to convert this group element into a randomlooking bit-string. This can be done using a deterministic extractor. Another application of extractors is design of cryptographically secure pseudorandom generators. An efficient pseudorandom generator based on elliptic curves is proposed by Barker and Kelsey [1] . Unfortunately, their generator (called Dual Elliptic Curve generator) is insecure the reason being that random bits are extracted from random points of the elliptic curve in an improper way [21, 8] . Replacing the extractor used by Barker and Kelsey with one of our extractors yields a pseudorandom generator which is provably secure under the DDH assumption and the x-logarithm assumption [3] .
Note that the number of points of any ordinary elliptic curve defined over a finite field with characteristic two is even. Therefore, DDH problem in the corresponding group is easy and thus the group is not suitable for many cryptographic applications. In the case that the order of E equals 2m for odd m, we propose two deterministic extractors Ext i , where i ∈ {0, 1}, for the subgroup G of order m. In particular, m can be chosen to be prime, so the DDH problem in the subgroup is assumed to be intractable. Extractors Ext i , are modified versions of extractors H i , i ∈ {0, 1}. We show that if the point P is chosen uniformly at random in G, the extracted bits of the point P are indistinguishable from a uniformly random bit-string of length .
Sequences of x-coordinates of pseudorandom points on elliptic curves have been studied in [13, 17, 25] . Kaliski [15] shows that if a point is taken uniformly at random from the union of an elliptic curve and its quadratic twist then the x-coordinate of this point is uniformly distributed in the finite field. On the other hand, the x-coordinate of a uniformly random point on an elliptic curve can be easily distinguished from uniformly random field element since only about 50% of all field elements are x-coordinates of points of the curve. Our extractors provide only part of the x-coordinate and thereby avoid this problem. Our approach is somewhat similar to the basic idea of pseudorandom generators proposed by Gong et al. [9] and Beelen and Doumen [2] in that they use a function that maps the elliptic curve to a set of smaller cardinality. In the former case, this function outputs the trace map of the x-coordinate of the point on a binary curve. So each point gives rise only to one bit. The latter studied more general functions so that some more bits per point can be obtained. Our aim is to extract as many bits as possible while keeping the output distribution statistically close to uniform.
At the moment, several deterministic randomness extractors for elliptic curves are known. One of the extractors is proposed by Gürel [10] . Given a point P on the elliptic curve E(F p 2 ) defined over a quadratic extension of a prime field, it extracts half of the bits of the abscissa of P . Provided that the point P is chosen uniformly at random, the statistical distance between the extracted bits and uniformly random bits is shown to be negligible [10] . In the same paper, Gürel proposes an extractor that is designed for elliptic curves over prime fields. However, the latter extracts essentially less than half of the bits of the abscissa of P . Another extractor for elliptic curves over prime fields is the TAU technique of Chevassut et al. [4] . This technique allows to extract almost all the bits of the abscissa of a point of the union of an elliptic curve and its quadratic twist. Note that both techniques mentioned above can be applied only for elliptic curves over odd prime fields and their extensions, although in many cases elliptic curves over binary fields can be implemented more efficiently (see, e.g., [11] ). Till now, the problem of constructing an efficient deterministic extractor for elliptic curves over binary fields remained open.
Preliminaries
Let us define the notations and recall the basic definitions that are used throughout the paper.
Notation. A field is denoted by F and its algebraic closure by F. Denote by F * the set of nonzero elements of F. The finite field with q elements is denoted by F q , and its algebraic closure by F q . Let C be a curve defined over F q , then the set of F q -rational points on C is denoted by C(F q ). The cardinality of a finite set S is denoted by #S. We make a distinction between a variable x and a specific value x in F.
Binary Elliptic Curve
Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over
where f (x) = x 3 + ax 2 + b, such that a and b are in F 2 N and O E denotes the point at infinity. Note that b = 0, since the curve is nonsingular.
Let N = 2 , where is an arbitrary positive integer. Consider F 2 N as a quadratic extension of F 2 . Then fix the polynomial representation
Obviously c is a nonzero element of F 2 and Tr(c) = 1, where Tr : F 2 −→ F 2 is the trace function. For all x in F 2 N , we can write x = x 0 + x 1 t, where x 0 and x 1 are in F 2 .
Deterministic Extractor
In our analysis we use the notion of deterministic extractor, so let us recall it briefly. For general definition of extractors we refer to [24, 28] .
First Extractor for Binary Elliptic Curves
In this section we introduce a new extractor for the ordinary elliptic curve E defined over F 2 N . We recall that F 2 N is the quadratic extension of F 2 . The first extractor, for a given random point on E, outputs the first F 2 -coordinate of the abscissa of the point.
The extractor H 0 is defined as a function
The following theorem gives a tight estimate for #H
and for x 0 = 0, #H
For the proof of Theorem 3.1 we need several propositions and lemmas. Consider the Weil restriction of E to F 2 and fix the element x 0 in F 2 . The points of H −1 0 (x 0 ) form a curve C x 0 in this restriction. The curve C x 0 can be defined by two equations in A 3 F 2 as follows:
where x 1 , y 0 and y 1 are variables and
The goal is now to compute #C x0 (F 2 ). Let C x 0 be the plane curve that is defined by the affine equation
where
Define the affine curve A x 0 as follows. Let z 0 = y 0 (y 0 + x 0 ) + c 2 x 3 1 , for x 0 ∈ F * 2 . Then define the affine curve A x 0 by the equation
For x 0 = 0, define the affine curve A 0 to be the reduced curve of C 0 . Hence A 0 is defined by the equation
Proposition 3.5. The number of F 2 -rational points on the affine curve
Proposition 3.6. The numbers of F 2 -rational points on the affine curves C x0 and A x 0 are equal.
Second Extractor for Binary Elliptic Curve
In this section we introduce another extractor for the ordinary elliptic curve E defined over F 2 N . The second extractor, for a given point on the elliptic curve, outputs the second F 2 -coordinate of the abscissa of the point.
The extractor H 1 is defined as a function
The following theorem gives the estimate for #H
and for x 1 = 0, in case that b 1 = 0, then
)-deterministic extractor for E(F 2 N ).
Extractors for a Subgroup
In this section we introduce two extractors for the main subgroup of the elliptic curve E defined over F 2 N , where E has minimal 2-torsion.
where m is odd. If d = 1, then E is said to have minimal 2-torsion. Note that E has minimal 2-torsion if and only if Tr(a) = 1. That means half of the elliptic curves defined over F 2 N , have minimal 2-torsion. If E has minimal 2-torsion, then we can use the point halving technique instead of point doubling. In this method a point P = (x, y) is represented by (x, λ), where λ = x+y/x is the slope of the doubling. This representation gives a faster implementation for scalar multiplication based on halving instead of doubling. For more information see [16] and [22] .
Assume that E has minimal 2-torsion. Hence #E(F 2 N ) = 2m. Let G be the subgroup of E of odd order m. E has the point T = (0, √ b) of order 2. The point P = (x, y) is in the subgroup G if and only if P = 2Q for some point Q ∈ E(F 2 N ). That follows assuming P ∈ E, then P ∈ G if and only if Tr(x) = Tr(a) = 1. See [23, 27] .
Let β be a bit distinguishing P = (x, y) from −P = (x, x + y) as follows.
Note that if P ∈ G and P = O E , then −P = P , since the order of G is odd. For example the function β can be defined as the least significant bit of y/x. We note that the point P = (x, y) can be represented by (x, λ), where λ = x + y/x. If we represent P = (x, y), by (x, λ), then −P = (x, x + y) is represented by (x, λ + 1). Hence the function β can be defined as the least significant bit of λ.
Let us define the extractors Ext i , for i ∈ {0, 1}. The extractor H i in Sections 3 and 4 is defined as the function
Define the extractor Ext i as follows.
It is easy to see that the abscissa of the point P + T is √ b
x . Hence
)-deterministic extractor for G.
Concluding Remarks
In this section we suggest suitable parameters for the extractors Ext i , where i ∈ {0, 1}. Also we discuss some implementational issues.
Security Parameter
Since the discrete logarithm problem for supersingular curve is rather easier than that for ordinary elliptic curve, then we consider E to be an ordinary elliptic curve. See [19] . Furthermore, for many cryptographic application E is defined over F 2 n , where n is a prime number. But it is not so necessary.
Recall that we considered E over E(F 2 N ), where N = 2 . To make E secure under GGHS attack, let be a prime number and = 127. For more details see [5, 6, 7, 12, 18, 20] . The extractors Ext i are defined in the subgroup G of E(F 2 N ). For many cryptographic applications m, the order of G, should be prime. We recall that E has minimal 2-torsion. Hence #E(F 2 N ) = 2m.
The finite fields F 2 178 , F 2 226 , F 2 1018 and F 2 1186 are suggested in [5] , which are secure under GGHS attack. Furthermore by ghost bit bases(GBB) technique (See [26, 14] ), the arithmetic operation in these fields can be performed more quickly than in prime extension of F 2 of the same size.
Experimental Results
Our experiments with MAGMA for #H −1 i (z), where z ∈ F 2 , show that the bounds in Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 are tight.
Also the experiments suggest the following conjecture. Let E(F 2 n ) be an elliptic curve, where n is a positive integer. In particular n can be prime. Let P = (x, y) ∈ E(F 2 n ). Let x ∈ F 2 n is represented by the bit-string (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ). Consider the extractor ext for E(
k , where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that the output of ext for the point P = (x, y) is the k bits of the bit-string of x in fixed positions. For example ext can be defined as
k -valued random variable that is defined as X = ext(P ), for P ∈ R E(F 2 n ).
Conjecture 6.1. The random variable X is statistically close to the the uniform random variable U k .
where g is constant.
We leave the proof of this conjecture as an open problem. Similar to the definition of extractors Ext i in Section 5, one can define an extractor for the main subgroup G of E (F 2 n ) , where E has minimal minimal 2-torsion.
Conclusion
We introduce two deterministic extractors H i , for the ordinary elliptic curve E defined over F 2 N , where N = 2 and is a positive integer. The extractor H 0 (respectively H 1 ), for a given point P on E outputs the first (respectively the second), F 2 -coordinate of the abscissa of P . The main part of the analysis of these extractors is to compute #H −1 i (z), for z ∈ F 2 . That is counting the number of F 2 -rational points on the fibers C z on the Weil restriction W F 2 N /F 2 (E) of E. Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 show tight estimates for #H −1 i (z). We use these results to construct two extractors for the main subgroup G of E, where E has minimal 2-torsion. The order of G is odd. In particular if the order of G is prime, then DDH problem in G is assumed to be intractable, which is crucial for many cryptographic applications. The analysis of the extractors shows that if the point P is chosen uniformly at random in G, then the bits extracted from P are statistically close to a uniformly random bit string of length .
